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VII. CONCLUSION
The ordinance of New Bern was definitely in the interest of its
citizens. The required reports could possibly mean the swift apprehen-
sion of dangerous criminals. Thus, it was within the ordinance-making
power of the city.56 However, because of the limitations placed upon
that power, local ordinances are not the solution for the problem. A
state statute is necessary to achieve the appropriate result. New Hano-
ver and Alamance counties have effectively protected their health care
communities from possible serious consequences for well-intentioned
actions. New Bern has not been as successful in its attempt to do the
same. North Carolina's medical contingent must take the initiative in
preparing proposed legislation for consideration by the General Assem-
bly. A state statute, uniform in application and interpretation, and
capable of granting immunity to the individual making the report, is
necessary for the protection of a segment of the population that is so
vital to North Carolina's welfare.
ROBERT A. BRADY
An Historical Analysis of Mandatory Capital Punishment
The case and statutory history of the death penalty in the United
States is well documented." Its continued constitutionality is, however,
a matter of debate. In one-hundred and eighty years since the passage
of the eighth amendment,2 the United States Supreme Court has not
once held the death penalty unconstitutional;8 yet there has unquestiona-
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-174 (1972).
1. H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (1967 rev. ed.); E. BERKSON, THE
CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT (1975); DAVIS, THE MOVEMENT TO
ABOLISH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1787-1861, 23 (1957); Forman, Capital
Punishment: "Evolving Standards of Decency", 19 LOYOLA L. REV., 81 (1972-73);
Grannucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57
CALIF. L. REV., 839 (1969); P. Makcey,. The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punish-
ment: An Historical Note, 54 B.U.L. REV., 30 (1974); Passell, Deterrent Effect of the
Death Penalty: A Statistical Test, 28 STAN. L. REV., 61-80 (1975); Note, Capital
Punishment in Virginia, 58 VA. L REV., 97 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law--Capital
Punishment, 41 FORDHAM L. REV., 671 (1973); Note, Discretion and the Constitution of
the New Death Penalty Statute, 87 HAv. L. REV., 1690 (1974); Comment, Supreme
Court. and Capital Punishment from Wilkerson to Witherspoon, 14 ST. Louis L.J., 463
(1970).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3. State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973).
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bly been a steady erosion of its constitutional underpinnings. 4  Within
the limits of that debate, this comment will examine the degree to which
the United States Supreme Court is bound by stare decisis and evaluate
whether any ruling by the court would weaken the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers.
AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF MANDATORY
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
I. JURY NULLIFICATION
American penal policy is marked by a "rebellion against" 5 the Eng-
lish common-law rule imposing mandatory death sentences on all con-
victed murderers. The first Congress of 1789, for example, passed the
eighth amendment to prohibit the use of excessive and cruel penalties,6 a
principle that had been stated in the English Magna Carta, but had
never been enforced.7  The penalties included death by torture and by
beheading for the crime of murder. Later, during antebellum America,
it was reported that ". . . murderers were escaping punishment alto-
gether because of the jurors' reluctance to impose the death penalty."8
In some jurisdictions, 9 distinctions began to appear between types of
murder; the death penalty was completely abolished in still other
states.'"
Following the Civil War, many states vigorously enforced the manda-
tory death penalty." Simultaneously, the United States Supreme Court
4. Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment?, Furman v. Georgia, 1972 SUPREME
COURT REV., 1.
5. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
6. Id. at 198.
7. Chapter 14 of the Magna Charta states: "A free man shall be amerced for a
trivial offence, and in accordance with the degree of the offence; and for a serious offence
he shall be amerced according to its gravity, saving his livelihood; and a merchant
likewise saving his merchandise; in the same way a villein will be amerced saving his
wainage; if they shall fall into our mercy. And none of the aforesaid amercements shall
be imposed except by the testimony of reputable men of the neighborhood." See
Grannucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment, at 845-46 (1969). The English Bill of
Rights stated that "excessive bail ought not to be required nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." See I W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2; 8 ENGLISH
HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS, 1669-1714, 122 (A. Browning, Ed., 1953).
8. Mackey, The inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: Historical Note, 54
B.U.L. REv. 30, 32 (1974). "Antebellum Americans then, whose experience with
mandatory capital punishment was extensive, tended to account it a dangerous failure.
They were satisfied that mandatory capital punishment indeed has a deterrent effect, it
deterred jurors from convicting palpably guilty men."
9. 402 U.S. at 198.
10. The North Carolina Attorney General's office has compiled a detailed report,
dated April, 1975, which documents the current status of the death penalty in each state.
11. Davis, The Movement to Abolish Capitol Punishment in America, 1787-1861,
63 AM. HIs. REV., 23 (1957).
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itself began to recognize the necessity of relaxing mandatory death
sentencing as a means of "humanizing" the penalties. 2 For example, it
remanded the case of Calton v. Utah,"3 where the jury had not been
informed of its right to decide whether a murderer ought to receive life
imprisonment or an execution. It examined contemporary writings on
capital punishment and compared the American scheme of punishments
to the practices of other nations.' 4 Its dissenters rallied against the
excessive and unnecessarily cruel nature of capital punishment.' 5
By the late 1800's, the problem of jury nullification 6 had appeared
again. A Congressional Act of 1897 established the right of federal
juries to qualify the mandatory imposition of the death penalty, the
object of the bill being
...to diminish the infliction of the death penalty by limiting the
offenses upon which it is denounced and by providing in all cases
a latitude in -the tribunal which shall try then to withhold the ex-
tremest punishment when deemed too severe.' 7
Two years later, in Winston v. United States,'8 the Court remarked on
the trend in state legislatures to recognize the reluctance of jurors to
concur in capital convictions. Legislators, noted the Court, were com-
pensating for their nullification by allowing some cases of murder to be
punished by imprisonment, instead of death; by creating degrees of
murder, with any crime less than first degree murder requiring impris-
onment; and by permitting juries to decide whether murder should be
punished by death or imprisonment in certain mitigating circum-
stances.' 9 The Court held in Winston that federal juries could sentence
a convicted murderer to life imprisonment "at their discretion", 20 rather
than in mitigating circumstances only.
The Court's response to jury nullification stemmed from its recogni-
tion of the necessity of reducing mandatory death sentencing. Its award
of discretion evinced respect for the jury as representing the opinion of
the community towards types of punishment and the manner in which
they are imposed. 2 ' Nullification represented the wish of the communi-
12. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402 (1972).
13. 130 U.S. 83 (1888).
14. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879).
15. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
16. "Jury nullification" was the term describing the phenomenon of juries not willing
to convict clearly guilty men, because conviction automatically meant execution.
17. S. Rep. # 846, 53 rd. Cong., 3d Sess. (1894).
18. 172U.S. 303 (1899).
19. Id. at 310-11.
20. Andres v. U.S., 333 U.S. 740, 747 (1948).
21. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 388 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See FORSYTH,
HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JuRY, 367-68 (2nd. Ed. 1971). "When in respect of any class of
offenses the difficulty of obtaining convictions is at all general in England, we may hold
3
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ty itself to move away from mandatory death sentencing, and, conceiva-
bly, away from death sentencing itself. Whichever interpretation one
chooses, the Court did act to restrict the use of mandatory death penalties
as early as 1899.
II. THE EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY TEST
The evolving standards of decency test, developed at the end of the
nineteenth century, was used to evaluate the appropriateness of applying
certain punishments to certain crimes. 22 The Court had used a similar
concept in the case of Wilkerson v. Utah.23 There, the Court examined
how "developing thought" should affect its decisions.24 In 1910, the
landmark decision of Weems v. United States invalidated a Phillipine
legislative penalty, imposing fifteen years of hard labor and a $4,000
fine on a United States public official convicted of falsifying public and
official documents, on the grounds that it was cruel and unusual punish-
ment under both United States and Phillipine law. The Court held that
the eighth amendment ". . .is progressive . . . and not fastened to the
obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlight-
ened by a humane justice. ' '25  It then compared the punishments of
different jurisdictions, in relation to the offenses, and for the first time
invalidated a legislature's prescription of a specific criminal penality for
a certain offense. 6
The principle of permitting the clauses of the eighth amendment to
"acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice" was not applied in Francis v. Resweber.27 The Court in
Francis interpreted the Weems decision as one based on a comparison of
punishments. Since only one punishment--death-was involved in
Francis, the Court said that Weems did not apply.28 In Francis, the
state's electrical machinery suffered a mechanical difficulty and failed to
electrocute the petitioner Francis, a convicted murderer. A new death
warrant was issued and Francis appealed on the grounds that a second
it an axiom that the law require amendment. Such conduct in juries is the silent protest
of the people against undue serverity. This was strongly exemplified in the case of
prosecutions for the forgeries of bank-notes when it was a capital felony. It was in vain
that the charge was proved. Juries would not condemn men to the gallows for an
offense of which the punishment was out of all proportion to the crime; and as they
could not mitigate the sentence, they brought in verdicts of not guilty. The consequence
was that the law was changed; and when secondary punishments were substituted for the
penalty of death, a forger has no better chance of an acquittal than any other criminal."
22. Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
23. 99 U.S. 180 (1879).
24. Id.
25. 217 U.S. at 378.
26. Id. at 346-82.
27. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
28. Id. at 463.
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execution would violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
eighth amendment and deny him his due process rights under the four-
teenth amendment. 29
In ruling against the petitioner's plea, the Court based its decision on
what "the traditional humanity of modem Anglo-American law consid-
ered cruel and unusual punishment. '30  What was cruel and unusual
under the traditional humanity of modem Anglo-American law was the
"wanton" infliction of "unnecessary" pain.31 The infliction of pain
that was "inherent in the method of the punishment" was also consid-
ered cruel. The Court held that the pain suffered by the petitioner was
not inhumane or cruel under the traditional humanity test. Weems'
principle that the eighth amendment should be interpreted according to
modem notions of cruel and unusual was bypassed. How "the tradi-
tional humanity" of American law was being measured, or had ever
been established, the Court did not discuss. Nor was mention made of
"public opinion," one constitutional standard by which the Court has
determined whether or not a punishment violates the cruel and unusual
clause of the eighth amendment, and which both the Court in Weems,
and Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Francis, emphasized. 32 No au-
thority except the 1889 case of In Re Kemmler was cited by the Court to
support its holding. 3
Trop v. Dulles3M explicitly evoked the evolving standards-of-decency
test to measure the meaning of the eighth amendment, but applied a
predominantly static, not evolving standard. The Court referred to the
death penalty as used "throughout our history" and as being "widely
accepted".35 Then the Court held that the death penalty did not violate
the eight amendment's cruel and unusual clause. The mere survival of
the death penalty and its longtime use, the Court's reasoning implied,
proved that the standards of decency and cruelty had not changed
sufficiently to warrant ruling capital punishment unconstituional. The
Court did not indicate whether it knew what were the current standards
of decency, or if it did know, how it was measuring those standards.
The Court in Trop did note that the "moral and practical" arguments
29. Id. at 459.
30. Id. at 463.
31. Id. at 464.
32. ld. at 471.
33. Id. at 463.
34. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). "The words of the (Eighth) Amendment are not
precise, and . . . their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society ....
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man. While the state has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this
power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards."
35. Id. at 99.
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against capital punishment were "forceful".88  That these arguments
were recognized by the Court, even if they were not accepted, was
indicative of a change in the attitude of the Court toward capital
punishment. This recognition also required that the Court assign
weight to evidence supporting these arguments. An important example
of such an argument is the stance taken by the Court in both Weems
and Trop,17 that retribution should not be the sole basis for retaining the
death penalty. As expressed in Williams v. New York,
. . . retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal
law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become
important goals of criminal jurisprudence.88
The incorporation of these goals indicated that the standards of decency
were changing, despite the reluctance of the Court to admit that the
standards had changed sufficiently to make the death penalty unconsti-
tutional. Allowing juries the right to sentence a murderer to prison,
rather than to an execution, indicated such a shift in the attitude of the
Court, stated or unstated. The life of a person who took another
person's life was, according to Court fiat, worth preserving. Murderers
were no longer unthinking, unfeeling animals who needed to be put
away for their own sake, retribution's sake and for society's sake. 9 More
often than not, those sentenced to die were ignorant, poorly-educated
men,40 unable to articulate their response to their execution.4 But the
evolving ideas of rehabilitation, jury discretion, and decency-accepted
by the Court-expressed the belief that the deliberate loss of life was for
these men not any less agonizing, fearful and horrifying than it would be
for the most articulate, learned and wealthy of men. 42
The evolving standards of decency test and the idea of rehabilitation
were revitalized in Robinson v. California.43 There the Court held that
a state statute making it a misdemeanor for a person to be addicted to
the use of narcotics inflicted a cruel punishment on him, in violation of
the eighth amendment and the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.44 The Court considered and evaluated "current knowl-
edge" and "changing standards" concerning narcotic addiction, and
36. Id.
37. 408 U.S. at 344 (Marshall, J., concurring). See 356 U.S. at 97, 113 (Brennen,
J., concurring).
38. 337 U.S. 241 248 (1949).
39. H. MATMCK, TiH UNEXAMINED DEATH (1966).
40. National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Capital Punishment 1974, NATIONAL
PRISONER STATISTICS BULLETIN, No. SD-NPS-CP-3, (Nov. 1975).
41. G. Gottlieb, Capital Punishment, 15 CRnmE & DELIN'CY, 1 (Jan. 1969).
42. Id.
43. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
44. Id.
311
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concluded that it was a disease. 45 The Court also evaluated the statute
in terms of a wide range of alternatives to punishment which it believed
were available to the legislature. 46 Robinson thus stands for the right of
the United States Supreme Court to compare a state's punishment to
alternatives to punishment, or to other punishments, and to evaluate a
state's penal policy where a statute has been challenged as being uncon-
stitutional. Most of the Court's decisions, following Robinson and
concerning capital punishment, do not, however, give Robinson's prece-
dent as much weight as it might be given.
III. JURY DISCRETION TO RECOMMEND MERCY
The problem of jury discretion in capital punishment cases of the
twentieth century appeared in McGautha v. California47 (the last im-
portant capital punishment case before Furman v. Georgia48). There,
the petitioners contended that the jury's right to decide which convicted
slayers should live and which should die was discretionary. 49 The
petitioners claimed that this sentencing process denied them their four-
teenth amendment rights of due process because no rational basis had
been established by the state legislature to distinguish those who were
chosen to live from those who had been chosen to die. The petitioners
contended that discretion occurred more often than it had in the nine-
teenth century, when it had been first granted, because juries were
selecting only a small percentage of those convicted of a capital punish-
ment crime for execution.
The majority admitted that the percentage of convicted murderers
selected to die, rather than to live, was smaller than it had been in the
past.50 However, the legislature's inability to account for the distinction
between those who lived and those who died was not discussed by the
Court. In fact, it has never been discussed. Instead, the Court ad-
dressed the question whether the petitioner's rights were infringed by
permitting a jury to impose the death penalty without standards to guide
them." The McGautha Court answered by saying it felt it "beyond
human ability" (and thus beyond the legislature's ability) to attempt to
select those characteristics of homicides which deserve capital punish-
ment. 2 It also determined it was beyond human ability to translate
45. M. MELSTNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: THE SUPREME COURT AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 179-80 (1973).
46. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665 (1962).
47. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
48. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
49. 402 U.S. 183, 196 (1971).
50. Id. at 204.
51. Id. at 183.
52. Id. at 199.
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these characteristics into language understandable to the sentencer,
whether jury or judge. On this basis, the Court decided that there
existed no constitutional reason to upset the settled practice of standard-
less jury sentencing in capital punishment cases. 53
THE EXTENT OF THE COURT'S INTERVENTION IN
STATE LEGISLATIVE PUNISHMENT STATUTES
I. The Furman v. Georgia Decision
The per curiam decision in Furman v. Georgia54 held that statutes
permitting the jury total discretion to impose or not to impose the death
penalty, violated the eighth amendment and the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Each of the five
majority justices based his decision on a slightly different rationale, even
though the effect of the holding remained the same. Two Justices,
Marshall and Brennan, concluded that the death penalty, discretionarily
or mandatorily applied, was unconstitutional. Justice Brennan found
that the stat.; statutes5" violated the eighth amendment command that
the State "may not inflict punishments that do not comport with human
dignity."5 6 Justice Marshall noted that six purposes could possibly be
promoted by the state legislature in its use of the death penalty: retribu-
tion; deterrence; prevention of recidivism; encouragement of guilty
pleas and confessions; eugenics; and economy. However, Justice Mar-
shall concluded that these legitimate legislative purposes could all be
fulfilled by less severe penalties. 57 Justice Marshall noted that retribu-
tion has been "denigrated" as a goal of capital punishment, in both case
law and by legal scholars.5 8 Justice Marshall wrote that statistics do not
show any relationship between the murder rate and the presence and
use of capital punishment.5 His main argument, aside from indicating
53. Id. at 203.
54. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
55. One petitioner was convicted of murder in Georgia and was sentenced to death
under GA. CODE ANN., § 26-1005 (1969). The second petitioner was convicted of rape
in Georgia and was sentenced to death under GA. CODE ANN., § 26-1302 (1969).
The third petitioner was convicted of rape in Texas and sentenced to death under TEXAS
PENAL CODE, At. 1189 (1961).
56. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan found that "death is an
unusually severe and degrading punishment; there is a strong possibility that it is
inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by contemporary society is virtually total; and there is
no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than the less severe
punishment of imprisonment."
57. Id. at 342 (Marshall, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 343.
58. Id. at 351.
59. Id. at 360, 369, n.163. "Assuming knowledge of all the facts presently available
regarding capital punishment, the average citizen would . . . find it shocking to his con-
science and his sense of justice...." "Justice Powell suggests that this conclusion is
8
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that capital punishment is excessive, is that it is "morally unacceptable
to the people of the United States at this time in their history."60  Not
finding it necessary to settle the question of the constitutionality of the
death penalty, Justice Stewart simply held that the eighth and four-
teenth amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death
under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be "so wantonly
and freakishly imposed."'' 6 He also declined to accept the argument,
because "it has not been proved," that those few who are sentenced to
die are sentenced because of their race.62 Justice Douglas also declined
to rule on "whether a mandatory death penalty would otherwise be con-
stitutional," or whether a statute, non-discriminatory on its face, may in
its application violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment."3 Instead, he concluded that the states, because they per-
mitted discretionary sentencing, were discriminatory on their face and
in their operation. In that sense, they violated the mandate of the four-
teenth amendment's equal protection clause. Finally, Justice White
strictly narrowed the context of the question. 64 He held that the infre-
quent imposition of the death penalty makes it cruel and excessive
within the constitutional limitations of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments, when it is imposed without serving any social or penal
function. 65
The most immediate effect of the Furman decision was to allow
legislatures to eliminate the power of juries to recommend mercy. Tak-
en to the extreme, as it has been in a few states,66 the jury's historical
role as maintaining a ". .. link between contemporary, communal val-
ues and the penal system, 6 7 can be completely nullified. The alterna-
speculative, and he is certainly correct. But the mere recognition of this truth does not
undercut the validity of the conclusion. Mr. Justice Powell himself concedes that judges
somehow know that certain punishments are no longer acceptable in our society; for
example, he refers to branding and pillorying (as unacceptable). Whence comes this
knowledge?"
61. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J. concurring).
64. Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring). Justice White's questions concerned "
the constitutionality of the capital punishment statutes under which (1) the legislature
authorizes the imposition of the death penalty for murder or rape; (2) the legislature
does not itself mandate the penalty in any particular class or kind of case . . .but
delegates to judges and juries the decisions as to those cases, if any, in which the penalty
will be utilized; and (3) judges and juries have ordered the death penalty with such
infrequency that the odds are now very much against imposition and execution of the
penalty with respect to any convicted murderer or rapist." The Supreme Court had
originally granted certiorari on the question "does the imposition and carrying out of the
death penalty in (these cases) constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the 8th and 14th Amendments."
65. Id. at 312.
66. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1974).
67. Witherspoon v. U.S., 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).. See note 19 supra.
9
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five of a lesser punishment is not possible, as historically it has been,
where the imposition of the death penalty is mandatory.68  Most com-
mentators report the Furman decision as holding that statutes which are
discretionary on their face are unconstitutional.69 The question of what
the Court will do when faced with a statute non-discretionary or non-
discriminatory on its face, but still discretionary, arbitrary, or discrimi-
natory in its application, cannot be answered until such a case appears
before the Court.
The second effect was to thoroughly establish a precedent for the
Court. The Court's treatment of the case was clearly an examination of
whether the legislature's capital punishment policy was appropriate for
judicial evaluation. In lieu of the final holding that the policy was
unconstitutional, the decision is a precedent in favor of the Court's right
to conduct such an examination. 70  The discussion of the merits of such
intervention has been a part of the Supreme Court's history in capital
punishment as well as other areas of the law.
II. THE LEGISLATURE'S RIGHT TO DETERMINE
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT POLICY
Supporting the legislature's right to determine the limits and scope of
state capital punishment policy are three ideas broadly advanced by the
dissent in Furman. First, the states have always had the right to impose
restrictions on behavior in order to protect its citizens. This right has
been otherwise referred to as police power.71 The state also has a
legitimate interest in protecting its citizens; that interest is to protect
their lives and to keep their economic and social interests located in the
state.72 Secondly, the legislature, which determines these restrictions,
more immediately responds to society's "standards of decency". 73 The-
oretically, the public can change the legislative decision that offends its
sense of decency by electing new representatives. But, there can be no
such response or social dissent to a United States Supreme Court deci-
sion altering legislative policy or statutory law. Thirdly, the Court has
only infrequently invalidated a legislatively prescribed punishment. As
68. 408 U.S. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun emphatically
states that a death penalty for specific crimes without any alternative of lesser punish-
ment " . . . encourages legislation that is regressive and of an antique mold, for it
eliminates the element of mercy in the imposition of the punishment."
69. Comment, The Supreme Judicial Court and the Death Penalty: The Effect of
Judicial Choice on Legislative Options, 54 B.U.L. REv., 158, 164 (1974).
70. Ehrhardt, Hubbart, Levinson, Smiley and Wills, The Aftermath of Furman: The
Florida Experience, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 2, 3 (1973).
71. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
72. 408 U.S. at 418 (Powell, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 383 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
315
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the holdings of Trop, Francis, Weems, and In Re Kemmler 4 indicate,
the Court grants legislative standards in the area of capital punishment
a presumption of validity. 5 This presumption is based on what dissent-
ing Justice Powell describes as the legislature's "special competency. '76
Justice Powell earlier stated that where the Court decides to intervene
and enforce the Constitution, it should do so understanding its action to
be, in the words of Justice Holmes, ". . . the gravest and most delicate
duty that the court is called on to perform. ' 77 Emphasizing that the leg-
islature is presumed to embody society's standards of decency, "..
whether or not provable and whether or not true at all times .
Chief Justice Burger writes that the presumption could only be ".
negated by unambiguous and compelling evidence of legislative de-
fault."7 8
III. JUDICIAL RIGHT TO INTERVENE
a. Protection of Constitutional Rights
The United States Supreme Court's right and willingness to intervene
are defined and limited by the Constitution. For example, a petitioner,
on trial for committing a capital crime, claims his due process rights
under the eighth and fourteenth amendment are being violated by a
state that imposes the death penalty for certain categories of homocides.
Where such a claim has been raised, the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the eighth amendment imposes upon the Court a duty to in-
tervene, or critically analyze legislative judgment, and ". . . determine
the constitutional validity of a challenged punishment".79 When the
Court decides that the power of the legislature is in conflict with a
constitutional prohibition, it has the right to judge the conflict.8 0 If
necessary, the Court can then override legislative classifications of cer-
tain behavior as criminal, and overrule legislative prescription of cer-
tain punishments to curb that behavior.8 ' Evaluating state punishment
procedures in terms of the Constitution is also recognized as the Court's
duty."2 Implicit in this duty, as described in Weems and McGautha, is
the determination of whether the defendants have been denied rights
74. 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
75. 408 U.S. at 451 (Powell, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. id. at 431.
78. Id. at 384 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 258 (Brennen, J., concurring).
80. Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 378 (1899).
81. Id. at 378-80. The majority further stated that "in such case, not our discretion
but our legal duty, strictly defined and imperative in its direction, is invoked. Then the
legislative power (to define crimes and punishments) is brought to the judgment of a
power superior to it for that instant."
82. 402 U.S. at 195.
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guaranteed by the Constitution. 3  Such rights are the rights that the
Court is mandated to protect, and their existence provides the essential
motivation behind Weems.
b. The Bill of Rights and Fundamental Fairness Doctrines
The Bill of Rights and "fundamental-rights" tests have served as
guidelines for judicial evaluation of legislative enactments. These tests
are implicitly a part of the Furman discussion of the application of the
evolving-standards-of-decency test of the death penalty's constitutional-
ity. The fundamental fairness test established a gradual process of
"judicial inclusion and exclusion" based on the Justices' determination
of how fundamentally fair the state laws were according to present-day
standards.8 4 The doctrine was criticized for
...proscribing no specific and clearly ascertainable constitutional
command that judges must obey in interpreting the Constitution.8 5
Said one Justice, it left ". . . judges free to decide at any particular time
whether a particular rule or judicial formulation embodies an 'immuta-
ble principle(s) of free government', or is 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty', or whether certain conduct 'shocks the judges con-
science' or runs counter to some other similar, undefined and undefina-
ble standard." 6 Such freedom would permit the Justices to strike down
any state laws they did not like. 7
The second test selectively incorporates many of the Bill of Rights'
protections into the fourteenth amendment and therefore applies them to
the states.88  Among these are the right to trial by jury, the right against
compelled self-incrimination, the right to counsel, the right to compulso-
ry due process for witnesses, the right to confront witnesses, the right to
a speedy and public trial, the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures, and the right to be free from cruel and unusual punish-
ment.8 9
83. Id. at 226 (Black, J., separate opinion). See also 408 U.S. at 313-14 (White, J.,
concurring).
84. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
85. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 168 (Black, J., with Douglas, J., concur-
ring).
86. Id. at 168.
87. Id. at 176-79 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan presents the positive
aspects of the evolving rights test.
88. Id. at 176 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Distinguish Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937). The court in Palko indicated that it considered the privileges and
immunities of the Federal Bill of Rights to have originally applied only in cases
involving claims against the federal government. Only subsequently has the court begun
to see if provisions and protections in the Federal Bill of Rights could be absorbed into
the Fourteenth Amendment and apply to the states where as the majority explained, the
state law violated a fundamental principle of liberty and justice expressed in the Bill of
Rights.
89. Id. at 166 (Black, J., with Douglas, J., concurring).
317
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The purpose for applying these tests is to protect the rights of state
citizens, particularly at trial, as the Magna Carta had attempted to do
during the times when English citizens were liable ". . . to sudden
arrest and summary conviction in the courts and by judicial commissions
with no sure and definite procedural protections and under laws that
might have been improvised to try their particular cases."" °  The tests
provide the Court with a dilemma. The Justices can choose to strictly
limit the test protecting the rights expressly stated in the Bill of Rights.
State laws, which overtly infringe upon a citizen's rights not expressly
stated in the Bill, cannot therefore be struck down. On the other hand,
the Justices can choose to invalidate any law that, according to the
Justices' experience, unfairly infringes upon the citizen's right to his
liberty or property. This choice risks the possibility of imposing an
arbitrary and subjective judgment of what is proper criminal policy
upon the states.
The Court has, in fact, chosen to protect substantive and procedural
due process rights in a manner related to its handling of capital punish-
ment; where the state, in defining the legitimate interests it is trying to
protect, has clearly infringed upon a constitutionally protected right.
The Court has not directly ruled on whether it should more carefully
evaluate legislation which limits the "political process" in a way that
prevents the elimination or rewriting of unwanted state laws. It has,
however, specifically limited restrictions on the right to vote, on the
dissemination of information, on interference with political organiza-
tions, and on peaceable assembly.9 It has been urged that equally
careful scrutiny be given state laws which prevent an "insular" minority
from being able to use the political processes to change the law."
Similarly, the Court in Furman cautioned against allowing legislatures
unlimited freedom in their use of punishment. The Court commented
that the founding fathers passed the eighth amendment to prevent this
freedom from being used for cruel and tyrannical ends and for purposes
both "honest and sinister"." The potential of a state government to
usurp the rights of citizens and impose upon them cruel and unusual
punishments was also one important reason why the fourteenth amend-
90. Id. at 169.
91. U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153, n.4 (1938). See Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708-9 (1931) where a state statute, which permitted newspa-
pers considered scandalous or defamatory by the court, was used to enjoin the petitioner's
paper from printing further stories on the corruption of city government officials. The
court said that" . . . the statute must be tested by its operation and effect. . . . It is
thus important to note precisely the purpose and effect of the statute as the state court
had construed it."
92. 304 U.S. 144, 153, n.4 (1938).
93. 217 U.S. at 373-74.
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ment was proposed. 4 In Furman, the states were held to have discrimi-
nated in their death penalty.9 5 The states were also not able to show a
sufficiently legitimate interest to warrant a law depriving one of their
citizens of his fundamental right to life.96
c. Legislative Default
Aside from intervening to protect individual constitutional rights
infringed upon by state statutory law, the Court has intervened to
protect constitutional rights where legislatures have been guilty of de-
fault. Such intervention has been accomplished where there exists, as in
Robinson v. California, less restrictive alternatives. The Court can then
be expected to examine these alternatives and to determine whether any
of them can serve to uphold or protect the state's legitimate interests as
adequately as does the legislature's statutory law.97  Where the legisla-
ture has been hesitant to enact effective legislation, the Court has
intervened to fill legislative default, as in the civil rights laws of the late
1950's and 1960's, or in instances of labor-securities case law., Issues
that may arise after legislation has passed and are not settled by subse-
quent legislation, or that are not fully discussed at the time of passage
because of public pressure demanding immediately operable and "statis-
tically more successful law enforcement",9 9 will be subject to court
scrutiny and determination. The failure of a legislature to consider the
death penalty in light of contemporary thought regarding its imposition
and the meaning of "cruel" and "unusual" has also required the Court,
as in Furman, to fill legislative voids. 100 The question remaining to be
answered is the scope of judicial review of state legislation that imposes
the death penalty foi certain crimes.
94. 408 U.S. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 245. Justice Douglas pays particular attention to the equal protection
cases of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1961) and Yick We v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886). Gomillion states the court's reaction to the unconstitutional use of
absolute state power. "When a state exercises power wholly within the domain of state
interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is not carried
over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected
right . . . . (This principle) has long been recognized in cases which have prohibited a
state from exploiting a power acknowledged to be absolute in an isolated context to
justify the imposition of an "unconstitutional imposition."
96. id. at 359 (Marshall, J., concurring).
97. D. Victor, Furman v. Georgia; The Burger Court Looks at Judicial Review, LAw
& Soc. ORD., 393, 398 (1972).
98. Id. at 397.
99. There is case law showing that if a particular set of facts, upon which the
constitutionality of a state statute rests, do not exist anymore, the statute's constitutional-
ity can be challenged. 304 U.S. at 153.
100. See also Meltsner, supra note 45 at 269, n.29.
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NORTH CAROLINA: FROM MERCY TO MANDATORY
I. EARLY HISTORY
The common law rule of death for any person convicted of murder
was codified in North Carolina in 1778.1° 1 Earlier, in 1774, the
legislature enacted an act that prevented the "willful and malicious"
killing of slaves, and assigned a punishment of one year for the second
conviction if the person was convicted of murder. °2 In 1791, the
legislature attempted, in the preamble of another enactment, to make
the killing of a slave punishable, if adjudged to be murder, by death.
The court in State v. Boon, ruling on such a situation, held the defend-
ant could not be sentenced to death on the basis of the enactment,
because it was a preamble, and not effective law. 03 By 1837, accord-
ing to the revised North Carolina Chapter 34, murder, rape, statutory
rape, arson, castration, burglary, highway robbery, stealing bank notes,
slave stealing, burning a public building, breaking out of jail if under a
capital indictment, concealing a slave with the intent to free him,
mayhem, and accessory to murder, robbery, arson or mayhem, were,
among others, punishable by death. 04 Prior to 1893, there were no
degrees of murder in North Carolina. Murder was defined generally as
the killing of a human being with "malice aforethought", express or
implied, and was punishable by death.0 5 Malice aforethought meant
".. . an intent at the moment to do, without lawful authority and
without the pressure of necessity, that which the law forbids."'' 0
As of the enactment of Chapter 85, North Carolina Public Law of
1893, murder was redefined to include, among other acts, first degree
murder that was caused by means of poison, lying in wait, imprison-
ment, starving, torture or any kind of willful, deliberate or premeditated
killing. All other kinds of murder were designated as murders in the
second degree. 10 7 Death, retained for first degree murder under Chap-
101. State v. Boon, 1 N.C. 191, 192 (1801).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 193. The court in State v. Boon, in determining what the 1791 enactment
meant by saying that any person convicted of killing a slave was to be punished "as if
he had killed a free man", stated there were further questions to be asked. "In case the
person had killed a free man, what punishment would the law have inflicted on him?
Before this question can be solved another must be asked because upon that, solution of
the first depends. What sort of killing was it, or what circumstances of aggravation or
mitigation attended the name of murder, and were they such as justified it?"
104. N.C. Rev'd Stat. Vol. 1, ch. 34, sec. 5 (1837). In 1869 the General Assembly
reenacted death as the punishment for rape in the Public Law of 1868-69, ch. 167, sec. 2,
to give the penalty more than a common law base. State v. Waddell, supra, at n.2, for a
more complete outline of death penalty enactments particularly with regard to rape.
105. State v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641, 657, 174 S.E.2d 793. (1970).
106. State v. Crawford, 13 N.C. 425 (1828).
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. Ch. 85 (1893).
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ter 85, remained mandatory until 1949. At that time, the legislature
voted to amend the statute so that when rendering a verdict of guilty in a
case charging the defendant with murder, the jury could recommend
mercy and life imprisonment if it chose to do so.108 The mercy recom-
mendation applied in cases involving first degree murder, burglary, rape
and arson.
II. COURT REACTION TO Furman
In 1973, following the Furman decision, the North Carolina Supreme
Court wrote an opinion in the case of State v. Waddell that clearly
affected North Carolina's capital punishment law.1"9 The defendent
was charged with rape. He was convicted in the lower court, and
appealed to the supreme court on the grounds that the death penalty
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. Interpreting the holding in Furman, the su-
preme court said that the ". . . death sentence may not be inflicted if
either judge or jury is permitted to impose that sentence as a matter of
discretion."' 10 This wording characterized the holdings of many state
supreme courts, who also ruled on the constitutionality of their state's
statutes.111 The North Carolina Supreme Court took Furman's holding
a step further. It held that the Furman holding applied to sever the
mercy recommendation from the remainder of North Carolina General
Statutes § 14-17, and ruled the death penalty mandatory.
Though not admitting to have infringed upon the separation-of-pow-
ers protection of the North Carolina Constitution,1 ' the court said that
"the matter of retention, modification or abolition of the death penalty is
a question for the lawmaking authority rather than the courts.""' 3  The
legislature, the court noted, "responds to public opinion and, by legisla-
tive enactment, reflects society's standards.""' 4  Justice Lake also re-
ferred to Article XI, sec. 2 of the North Carolina Constitution, under
which only the legislature has the power to enact death penalty legisla-
tion ' 15 as he reemphasized the idea that it is the legislature that deter-
mines crimes and their punishments."16
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. Ch. 299 (1949).
109. 282 N.C. at 431.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 461-72 (Bobbitt, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
112. See N.C. CONST., art. 1, § 6.
113. Id. at 445.
114. Id.
115. N.C. CONST., art. 10, § 2. "The object of the punishments being not only to
satisfy justice, but also to reform the offender and thus prevent crime, murder, arson,
burglary and rape, and these only, may be punishable with death, if the General
Assembly shall so enact."
116. 282 N.C. at 449 (Lake, J., concurring).
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To support its intrusion, the court cites its conclusion that its study of
the history of the death penalty in North Carolina shows a "constant
intent" on the part of the people and the representatives to maintain the
death penalty,11 7 with or without a mercy recommendation provision.
The court also cites seventeen bills which were brought before the
North Carolina House of Representatives between 1949 and 1971 to
abolish or limit the death penalty, [and were either tabled or defeated],
as supporting its conclusion that the people are in support of mandatory
capital punishment. However, subsequent to the 1949 Amendment to
General Statutes § 14-17, and prior to Furman, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court never held that any constitutionally protected rights were
violated by the North Carolina statutes authorizing the jury to recom-
mend mercy for a convicted murderer. 118
The effect of the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision on the
legislature's enactment of a mandatory death sentence can only be
estimated. The court insisted that only the legislature was legally
authorized to respond to public opinion and can "give expression to
what it perceives to be the public will"."" But, the court had already
decided that the public supported capital punishment, and had based a
section of its reasoning upon that support. Thus, the legislature would
have countermanded judicial authority if it had perceived the public's
will as anything less than in full support of capital punishment.
Having eliminated all mercy recommendations, and any participation
by the jury until the legislature acted, the court's ruling resulted in a
wave of new death sentences that may have reinforced any legislative
belief in the concept that the mandatory death penalty was necessary to
curb the growing number of murders. If the court's opinion did not
specifically limit legislative options, the decision encouraged the legis-
lature to make little effort to explore alternatives to mandatory death.1 20
This response differed from the response of a number of other state
legislatures enacting new death penalty legislation following the Furman
decision. These enactments provided that a man could be sentenced to
life imprisonment rather than death where the homicide involved cer-
tain "mitigating"' 2 ' circumstances.
IlI. LEGISLATIVE REACTION TO Furman AND Waddell
On record, the legislature did not make any attempt to perceive the
117. Id. at 442.
118. Id. at 454 (Bobbitt, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
119. Id.
120. Raleigh.News & Observer, Jan. 26, 1974, at 4, Col. 1.
121. C. Ehrhardt, H. Levinson, The Florida Experience, 64 J. CIuM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 10, 16 (1973). Florida's statutory scheme for capital punishment is
particularly thorough.
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public will, evaluate in a systematic way the deterrent value of capital
punishment, or otherwise seriously consider alternatives to the mandato-
ry death penalty. What appears to have happened over the course of
the discussions for the final amendment of North Carolina General
Statutes § 14-17, is what one commentator calls "a gradual realization"
that the death penalty was needed to protect the society.' 22 On January
10, 1973, twenty-seven senators went on record in favor of an "in-depth
study" of legislation proposing deterrents to crime, including legislation
concerning capital punishment.123  However, none of the legislation
that was actually proposed was based on the studies of a task force.' 24
The first bills introduced in both the House and the Senate asked for
the mandatory death penalty in all possible categories of first degree
murder, rape, first degree burglary and arson. 125  House members
proceeded to introduce a bill in favor of life imprisonment, without
parole, for all categories;'26 a bill in favor of imprisonment for life for
all categories, with some provision for parole; 127 and one bill, which the
House passed, creating a three member panel of psychiatrists to com-
mute death sentences for certain mitigating circumstances. 12 1 In the
Senate, a bill calling for a mandatory death penalty, and a bill calling
for life imprisonment for the crime of rape (in certain instances) and
arson, were introduced on the same day.' 2 9 The rest of the Senate's
bills proposed mandatory death. Death for bombing,3 0 rape,' bur-
glary, 32 and arson, 33  was proposed in separate bills. One bill3 4
specified certain instances of premeditated murder that were to be
punished by death.' The Senate bill which was finally ratified by both
houses was introduced on January 30, 1973, and ratified April 8,
1974. s6
122. C. Patrick, Capital Punishment, 6 WAKE FoiL. INT. L. REv. 417 (1970).
123. S. Res. 9, 1973 N.C. General Assembly.
124. Letter from Paul H. Stock, Legislative Services Office, N.C. Gen. Assembly, to
John W. Poulos, Sept. 19, 1974.
125. H.B. 17, 1973 Gen. Assembly of N.C. (proposed but not passed). S. Res. 31,
1973 Gen. Assembly of N.C. (proposed but not passed).
126. H.B. 160, 1973 Gen. Assembly of N.C. (proposed but not passed).
127. H.B. 412, 1973 Gen. Assembly of N.C. (proposed but not passed).
128. Raleigh News and Observer, April 12, 1973, at 27, col. 1.
129. S. Res. 31 and S. 32, 1973 Gen. Assembly of N.C. (proposed but not passed).
130. S. Res. 33, 1973 Gen. Assembly of N.C. (proposed but not passed).
131. S. Res. 34, 1973 Gen. Assembly of N.C. (proposed but not passed).
132. S. Res. 433, 1973 Gen. Assembly of N.C. (proposed but not passed).
133. S. Res. 434, 1973 Gen. Assembly of N.C. (proposed but not passed).
134. S. Res. 37, 1973 Gen. Assembly of N.C. (proposed but not passed).
135. Id.
136. S. Res. 157, 1973 Gen. Assembly of N.C. The ratified bill reduced the number
of capital offenses to two-first degree murder which applies to a range of homicides,
and first degree rape (rape of a virtuous female under twelve by a person over sixteen,
or rape of a female over twelve where a deadly weapon is used or serious bodily harm is
323
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Throughout the period during which these bills were being proposed,
either Judiciary Committee I or Judiciary Committee II, composed of
members from the Senate and the House, evaluated each of the bills as
they were referred to them. There is no evidence that either committee
used or conducted any study of the use of alternatives to mandatory
capital punishment.' 7  Rather, the mandate of State v. Waddell, and
the history of the use of the death penalty in North Carolina were drawn
upon to strengthen the mandatory death penalty arguments and lan-
guage. The only study of policy for the general area of sentencing con-
ducted subsequent to the passage of the bill by the Commission on
Sentencing, Criminal Punishment and Rehabilitation, made the follow-
ing policy recommendations:
The North Carolina judiciary in exercising its considerable discretion
in the sentencing of individual offenders should impose the minimum
amount of custody or confinement, which is consistent with the pro-
tection of the public, the gravity of the offense and the rehabilitation
needs of the defendant.1 38
These recommendations encourage policies which are in direct opposi-
tion to the use of strict mandatory death penalty sentencing as a means
to curb crime-increased discretion, minimum custody and confine-
ment, rehabilitation, and particular allowance for mitigating circum-
stances, within the sentencing process.
THE COURT'S RESPONSIBILITY
Whether the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment and,
therefore, unconstitutional per se, in violation of the eighth amendment,
is the question that the United States Supreme Court must answer in
ruling on the North Carolina case of North Carolina v. Woodson and
Waxton,1 9 one of five cases currently before it. Four particular ap-
inflicted). The penalty upon conviction of burglary or arson was reduced from manda-
tory death to life imprisonment.
137. See 408 U.S. at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "While I cannot endorse the
process of decisionmaking that has yielded today's result and the restraint that that result
imposes on legislative action, I am not altogether displeased that legislative bodies have
been given the opportunity, and indeed unavoidable responsibility, to make a thorough
re-evaluation of the entire subject of capital punishment."
138. Report, North Carolina Commission on Sentencing, Criminal Punishment and
Rehabilitation, April 15, 1975.
139. 287 N.C. 578, 215 S.E.2d 607 (1975). A full hearing of a second more
important and complex case, North Carolina v. Fowler, has been temporarily postponed.
285 N.C. 90, 203 S.E.2d 803 (1974). The defendant in Fowler was charged with and
convicted of killing a "longtime" acquaintance and former roommate because of an
altercation over a gambling debt. In this case, North Carolina bottoms its right to
execute the defendant on the constitutionally retained right of state sovereignty, and on
the implicit acknowledgement under the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the power to
deprive a person of his life. See Respondent's Brief for Certiorari at 23, 43, North Caro-
lina v. Fowler, 419 U.S. 963 (1974). From this sovereignty and this power, the State
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proaches to the problem presented by capital punishment are predomi-
nant among a number of other answers which the Court may consider.
I. DISCRETIONARY DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING FOR JURIES
The Court could weaken or, more drastically, overrule the five to
four decision against capital punishment in Furman v. Georgia. The
majority's decision could be interpreted as vague; its vagueness reflected
in the various ways that state legislatures chose to interpret it and vague
in the Court's hesitancy to set standards for a state's sentencing of
capital offenders. Once characterized as vague, confusing or scattered,
the decision is subject to judicial disembowelment. In Furman, Chief
Justice Burger suggested three grounds for dismissing the concepts of
judicially imposed standards and discretion in jury sentencing proce-
dures: 1) that the Supreme Court has traditionally not interfered with
the legislative policymaking power; 2) that such standards were impos-
sible to set without further burdening the sentencer at a time when he
was trying to decide whether or not to approve the taking of a human
life; and 3) that the sentencing process has always and always will be
discretionary. 4 '
The persuasive complacency of this approach, with its generalized
truths, is to be guarded against. Not having themselves set standards
for the elimination of jury or judicial discretion, the Court has no basis
for believing or insisting that such standards would fail. Instead, the
Court defers to legislative judgment. The result is that legislatures are
permitted to establish their own standards, spoken or unspoken, written
or unwritten, for jury or judge. These standards, such as they are (for
example, statutory limitations on the use of the death penalty can be
classified as standards), are ones by which it is determined that men lose
their lives. The state's interest in setting these standards has been the
protection of the lives and welfare of its citizens. This interest has been
held a legitimate state interest for the purpose of enacting death-penalty
claims the right to choose any alternative method for achieving the ends of criminal jus-
tice, the right to insure domestic tranquility, and the right to have its judgments of other
states and the federal government, i.e., the right not to have the evolving-standards test
of decency applied to them. The petitioners argue against the State's right to impose the
death penalty on traditional grounds. See Petitioner's Brief at 102. North Carolina v.
Fowler, 419 U.S. 963 (1974). In addition, they show how North Carolina prosecutors,
attorneys, juries and governor, determine, in their discretion, who receives the death pen-
alty. The petitioners argue that an accused is thus sentenced to death because one of
these officials, in carrying out his professional duty, has chosen not to spare him. By
contending that discretion, found by the Furman Court to render jury sentencing uncon-
stitutional, pervades the entire criminal justice system, the petitioners seek to show that
death sentencing even without juries violates the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment and the cruel and unusual clause of the eighth amendment, and is therefore
unconstitutional.
140. 408 U.S. at 375-405.
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laws. Beyond stating this rationale, state legislatures have never had to
justify the death penalty as a method of protection. It has never had to
prove conclusively, or even slightly, that the death penalty deters homi-
cide better or more effectively than any other form of punishment.'41
Consequently the state's method of punishment is allowed to stand by
itself, supported only by the very general arguments of public support,
deterrence and retribution. As a result, the basis on which the state
legislature or state court system has decided that each defendant is not
fit to live is never stated or justified. As the state relieves a criminal of
his final right to life, which has been held to be fundamental, 4 2 in the
name of an ill-defined public interest, the Court spectates in silence and
condones this development.
H. MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY
The history of capital punishment in the United States is the history of
a movement away from mandatory capital punishment. A return to
mandatory execution, even for certain specified crimes, would emascu-
late the changes that have occurred in the use of the penalty. It would
ignore the significance of the decline in the penalty's use, and imply that
increased use will make the punishment constitutionally less cruel and
unusual. It would bypass the issue of discretion among prosecutors,
policemen, judges and governors. It would eliminate mercy and it
would not account for the death penalty being any more effective than
other forms of punishment to eliminate, under mandatory death penalty
statutes, certain specific crimes.
A return to mandatory death penalties would also substantially under-
mine the role of the public in determining the need for, and proper
application of, the death penalty. With juries eliminated (jury discre-
tion being an important constitutional reason for returning to mandatory
death penalties), public opinion about the death penalty would no
longer be registered. In fact it could be ignored completely. This is
substantially the case now. The United States Supreme Court cannot
decide where the public stands on the issue of capital punishment,
whether public opinion polls validly depict public opinion about the
death penalty, and to what extent public opinion, if ever determined,
determines in itself "contemporary standards of decency".' 43 The
141. Id., at 396 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice writes that requiring
the legislature to justify the imposition of the death penalty could result in requiring the
legislature to justify all its punishments.
142. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 358, 462 (1938). See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 77 (1957).
143. P. Ellsworth, N. Vidmar, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 STA'. L.
REv. 1245, 1246 (1974).
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Court often quotes the evolving-standards-of-decency test as a method
of evaluating public opinion, but never uses it systematically.
The dissent in Furman acknowledges the test's existence and sup-
posed use. One dissenter states that the eighth amendment forbids
the imposition of punishments that are so cruel and inhuman as to
violate society's standards of civilized conduct. 144  At the same time,
the dissenters' (or those who are in favor of some sort of capital
punishment) perspective on the death penalty excludes an in-depth
application of the decency test. The dissenters view the history of the
death penalty as supporting the death penalty, a self-enforcing analysis
by which the use of the death penalty provides its history while its
history provides the rational for its continued use. This view of the
history provides the death penalty with its presumption of validity. The
dissenters also support judicial restraint, which curbs judicial examina-
tion of such information as public opinion polls and legislative policy
reports. Finally the dissenters' means of measuring present-day stan-
dards are wholly unable to describe the final stage of the evolving
standard-ie., that which has evolved. 145
H. JURY SENTENCING FOR CERTAIN CRIMES
A third approach might suggest guidelines for jury sentencing with
regard to certain crimes, as established by the legislature. This ap-
proach would straddle the first two.
IV. DEATH PENALTY UNCONSTITUTIONAL PER SE
This alternative requires and is in need of the most penetrating
analysis. Every question must be weighed carefully. To accomplish this,
the Justices must drop their individual perspectives, and their conserva-
tive or liberal biases.
Many factors, if not influenced by the death penalty's presumption of
validity, point to abolishment. Standards of decency and cruelty have
144. 408 U.S. at 442 (Powell, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 442, n.37. Justice Powell selects state referendum, jury sentencing
patterns, legislatures and state courts as indicators of public opinion about the death
penalty. He refers to four state referenda. The final vote in one of these referendum
actually abolished the death penalty; another was only advisory in nature. As already
indicated, the legislatures, Justice Powell's second indicator, are not required to use the
evolving-standards test themselves when deciding on capital punishment. There is no
reason to believe that the legislators will distinguish between the state's interests and the
evolved standards of decency. The state courts, the third indicator of public opinion,
rarely explain their findings or their reasons for imposing the death penalty in certain
situations, and rarely use the evolving-standards test. Not only do state courts not
provide any opportunity for legislative acceptance or rejection, as the voice of the public
will, of their own capital punishment policy as applied, but they also do not systematical-
ly provide any kind of measurement of public opinion.
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changed, although, notwithstanding the death penalty, homicide rates
have not. Juries have been increasingly less able to agree on imposing
the death penalty, even though prosecutors attempt to keep people oppos-
ing the death penalty from becoming jurors in capital cases. Rehabilita-
tion, not retribution, is the aim and goal of criminal correction sys-
tems.' 46 The death penalty has been shown to have been used indis-
criminately against blacks, and not applied in an evenhanded manner.14 7
Discretion at every level of the criminal justice system-from the sen-
tencing system to the Governor's office-affects who gets sentenced to
death and who gets sentenced to prison, 48 and violates the accused's due
process rights under the fourteenth amendment. There exist no studies
which definitively show that the existence of the death penalty deters a
man from committing a capital crime any more effectively than any
other alternative. State legislatures have thinned their death penalty
statutes, in many instances, to apply to one or two special crimes.' 49
Each of these factors waits to be weighed by the Court. Each conten-
tion contributes to the final weighing of the constitutionality or unconsti-
tutionality of the death penalty--discretionary, arbitrary, discriminatory,
unusual, cruel and unnecessary; all antithetical to the "traditional hu-
manity of the Anglo-American law".
CONCLUSION
The Court must decide between total unconstitutionality and some
alternative decision which will prevent a state, by itself, from taking a
man's life on the basis of an unexamined mandatory death policy.
Deciding the constitutionality of a mandatory-death-sentence statute is
an unavoidable duty. The Court can attack that duty, not by deferring
to legislative judgment and the concept that the legislature represents the
wishes of the people, but by critically evaluating the merits of the
legislature's policy rationale and establishing standards--out of what the
Court itself has used in its long history-by which such rationales are to
be evaluated in the future. 50 More importantly, the Court must exam-
ine its own silent support of capital punishment, as attacks on the
constitutionality of the death penalty multiply, so that it may itself not
be guilty of default. Morality and discrimination aside, the strongest
146. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
147. M. Wolfgang, M. Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion and the Death Penalty, 407
ANNALS, 119 (May. 1973). See also G. Johnson, THE NEGRO AND CRIME, ANNALS, 217
(Sept. 1941); E. Johnson, Selective Factors in Capital Punishment, 36 SOCIAL FORCES,
165 (Dec. 1957).
148. State v. Jarette, 284 N.C. 625, 202 S.E.2d 721 (1974).
149. Capital Punishment Statutes, Litigation and Inmates Sentenced, COAG, Office
of N.C. Atty. Gen. (1975).
150. 284 N.C. 625, 659, 202 S.E.2d 721 (1974).
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MUSIC-THE UNIVERSAL HEALER
argument against the death penalty is that the modem American crimin-
al justice system is too imprecise a system to use capital punishment as a
surgical tool to excise the tumor of crime and violence.
JAMES T. BRYAN III
Music The Universal Healer:
First Amendment Protection-Real or Illusory?
I. INTRODUCTION
The central importance of musical expression in civilized society has
long been proclaimed. Longfellow said, "Music is the universal lan-
guage of mankind." Milton said "Such sweet compulsion doth in music
lie." Shakespeare said, "The man that hath no music in himself, nor is
not moved with concord of sweet sounds is fit for treasons, strategems
and spoils." Carlyle said:
Music is well said to be the speech of angels; in fact, nothing among
the utterances allowed to man, is felt to be so Divine. It brings us
near to the Infinite; we look for moments across the cloudy elements
into the eternal light, when song leads and inspires us. Serious na-
tions, all nations that can listen to the mandate of nature, have prized
song and music as a vehicle for worship, for prophecy, and for what-
soever in them was Divine.
Surely judicial notice can be taken of the fact that not one of these
men could ever seriously have contemplated the seemingly inexorable
entanglement that has evolved and presently exists concerning our first
amendment guaranty of freedom of speech and musical expression in
the broadcast media. This article will examine musical expression and
how it is viewed by the Federal Communications Commission, as well as
the relationship between music and the first amendment's freedom of
speech. More specifically, this discussion will focus on three areas: (1)
a general history and background of the FCC and the broadcast media;
(2) the FCC's involvement with musical expression in the broadcast
media; and (3) first amendment protection of musical expression.
II. THE FCC AND THE BROADCAST MEDIA:
A GENERAL BACKGROUND
At the turn of the century, radio was confined to wireless telegraphy
(largely for marine purposes), and code communciation was possible
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